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INTRODUCTION 
On September 17, 2009, the attorney general of New Jersey filed a 
sixteen-count civil complaint against the president and board of trustees of 
Stevens Institute of Technology.1  The complaint set forth a lengthy list of 
alleged misdeeds including providing excessive compensation and low-
interest loans to the president without proper authorization, and concealing 
 
 *   Interim Dean and Paul R. Dean Professor of Law, Georgetown University 
Law Center.  I am grateful to Matthew Berns, William Bratton, Jonathan Cooper, 
Richard Cooper, Donald Langevoort, Rick Legon, John Olson, Ronald Pearlman, 
Milton Regan, and Robert O‘Neil for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of 
this Article, and to Michael Crapanzano for his research assistance. 
 1. Complaint, Milgram v. Trs. of the Stevens Inst. of Tech., No. HUD-C-115-09 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Sept. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases09/pr20090917a-complaint.pdf (last visited May 
11, 2010). 
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negative financial reports from the full board.
2
  The national press did not 
report the filing for more than three months but, recognizing that the case 
was both important and rare, the New York Times eventually put the story 
on page one
3
 and followed it with an editorial urging the legislature ―to 
strengthen New Jersey‘s weak laws governing the financial behavior of 
colleges and other nonprofit institutions.‖4 
 The filing raised a number of questions about the responsibilities of 
college and university governing boards:  By what authority does a state 
attorney general bring a complaint against a private university?  What are 
the legal obligations of trustees of private colleges and universities?
5
  Are 
they different from the obligations of trustees of public institutions of 
higher education?  How are boards of trustees held to account?  Are 
existing accountability mechanisms effective? 
To answer these questions and to understand more generally the 
responsibilities of trustees, Part I of this article traces the evolution of the 
role of governing boards in the United States, from guiding the first 
colonial colleges to overseeing more than 4,300 institutions of higher 
education, which range in size and mission from small, sectarian, private 
colleges and two-year community colleges to multi-campus public 
universities with tens of thousands of students and multiple doctoral and 
professional programs.6  This history reveals how their distinctive 
governance structure helped to promote academic excellence by providing 
American colleges and universities with significant autonomy from 
government control.  In the twentieth century, governing boards further 
refined their role by embracing shared governance, a system in which 
governing boards delegate primary responsibility for academic matters to 
faculties.
7
  The combination of autonomy from state control on the one 
 
 2. Complaint, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 38, 40, 41, 332.   
 3.  See Sam Dillon, College Is Beset by Accusations in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 22, 2009, at A1. 
 4. Editorial, The Stevens Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2009, at A24.  The 
parties reached a settlement on January 15, 2010.  See infra text accompanying notes 
127–128.  
 5.  Colleges and universities use a variety of names for the members of their 
respective governing boards, including ―curator,‖ ―director,‖ ―manager‖ and ―regent.‖  
The term ―trustee‖ is used here to encompass all of the many names employed.  
Although the for-profit sector in higher education has grown significantly in size and 
importance in the last few decades, this article will focus on nonprofit and public 
institutions.    
 6. See 2005 Carnegie Classification of institutions of Higher Education Efforts to 
Combat Illegal File Sharing and Plagiarism, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 28, 2009, at 
36.  Although only 1,700 of the 4,300 institutions are public, the majority of post-
secondary degrees awarded are from public institutions.  Growth in Bachelor’s Degrees 
Awarded by Field of Study, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 28, 2009, at 16.   
 7.  See infra Part I.B.  
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hand and shared governance on the other has produced what is widely 
considered the leading system of higher education in the world.
8
  
Part II of the article analyzes the three primary ways in which governing 
boards are held to account: (1) competition, (2) regulation, and (3) 
accreditation.  Together, they have created a market in higher education 
that is both lightly regulated, and quite competitive.  Part III sets forth 
recommendations on how governing boards best can meet key legal and 
structural responsibilities.   
I. EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE.  
A. Lay Governing Boards  
 In order to understand the responsibilities of governing boards, it helps 
to have some knowledge of how the American system of governance 
evolved and how it compares to the systems common in other countries.  
There are three primary models of academic governance in use: (1) control 
by the faculty; (2) control by the state; and (3) control by governing boards.  
Although the faculty-control model arose in the Middle Ages, a few 
institutions, including Oxford and Cambridge, are still run by their 
faculties.  At Oxford, a twenty-six member Council sets policy for the 
university on most matters, but final responsibility rests with Congregation, 
a body that includes some 4,000 members of the academic, senior research, 
library, museum, and administrative staffs.
9
  At Cambridge, although a 
twenty-one member Council is the principal policy-making organ of the 
university, the ultimate governing body is Regent House, which consists of 
some 3,800 officers, fellows, faculty, and others.
10
  Efforts to streamline the 
governance structure of each university were defeated in recent years.  In 
2006, the then-Vice-Chancellor of Oxford proposed the adoption of an 
American-style governing board.  After heated debate, Congregation, by a 
vote of 720 to 456, turned down the proposed change.
11
  In 2009, the 
 
 8.  See JONATHAN R. COLE, THE GREAT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 1–5 (2009) 
(America has ―the greatest system of higher learning that the world has ever known‖ 
whether measured by the quality of faculty and students, rankings of universities, or 
number of Nobel Prizes received).  The most recent Annual Ranking of the World 
Universities by Jiao Tong University of Shanghai placed 55 American universities in 
the top 100 positions.  The only non-American institutions in the top twenty were the 
Universities of Cambridge (4), Oxford (10), and Tokyo (20). ARWU–2009, Academic 
Ranking of World Universities 2009, available at http://www.arwu.org/ 
ARWU2009.jsp (last visited May 11, 2010). 
 9.  News: Next Steps for Oxford Governance, Oxford University, 
http://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/po/051212.shtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).   
 10. How the University Works, University of Cambridge, http://www.cam.ac.uk/ 
univ/works/regenthouse.html (last visited May 11, 2010).     
 11. Report of the Proceedings in Congregation, 28 Nov. 2006, OXFORD UNIV. 
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Higher Education Funding Council for England, which provides public 
funds to Oxford, Cambridge, and other institutions of higher education, 
proposed that thegoverning council of Cambridge University should have a 
majority of outside trustees, but then agreed to defer the proposal for three 
years.
12
    
 The second governance model—control of colleges and universities 
by the government—is most prevalent in continental Europe, Asia, and 
Latin America.  Although there are signs that European countries are 
moving towards greater university independence,
13
 it remains the case that 
many countries limit the autonomy of their institutions of higher education 
and thereby hinder their ability to function well.14  In six European 
countries, for example, appointments of some staff (usually faculty) must 
be approved by a national Ministry of Education or the President of the 
country.15  In most of Europe, the government sets individual faculty 
salaries,16  and in nine countries, it determines tuition or fees.17  
  The third model of governance, which is widely followed by both 
private and public institutions of higher education in the United States, puts 
control in the hands of a lay governing board (―lay‖ meaning nonfaculty).18 
 
GAZETTE, Dec. 7, 2006, available at www.ox.ac.uk/gazette/2006-7/supps/1_4791.htm.  
The Vice-Chancellor elected to take the matter in December to all of Congregation by 
postal ballot.  This time, more than 2,500 members of Congregation voted, and again 
the proposal was rejected when more than sixty percent of those who voted opposed the 
change.  Rejection on a Division of Amended Legislative Proposal Confirmed by Postal 
Vote, OXFORD U. GAZETTE, Jan. 11, 2007, available at www.ox.ac.uk/gazette/2006-
7/weekly/110107/acts.htm. 
 12. Donald MacLeod, Cambridge Dons Retain Control of University, Guardian, 
March 20, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2009/mar/20/ 
cambridge-dons-control.    
 13. THOMAS ESTERMANN & TERHI NOKKALA, UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY IN EUROPE 
I: EXPLORATORY STUDY 42 (European University Association (EUA) 2009),  available 
at http://www.upr.si/fileadmin/user_upload/RK_RS/EUA_Autonomy_Report_ 
Final.pdf.   
 14. Id. See also Simon Marginson, Going Global: Governance Implications of 
Cross-Border Traffic in Higher Education, in COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF ACADEMIC 
GOVERNANCE 1, 7 (William G. Tierney ed., 2004) (In Western European countries ―the 
nation remains a central actor in governance.‖); COLE, supra note 8, at 459 (French 
system of higher education ―is very closely linked to state control . . . with national 
policies controlling the operation of individual units in the system to  an excessive 
degree.‖); Id. at 461 (In Germany ―[t]here is a high level of bureaucratic state control of 
the system. . . . [T]he absence of competition within Germany itself creates stagnation 
in the system and hurts the quality of higher education within the country.‖).   
 15. The six are Bulgaria, France, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and some 
German states.  Id. at 28.   
 16. Id. at 41.   
 17. Id. at 22.  The nine include France, Spain, and Turkey.    
 18. See Ass‘n of Governing Bds. of Univs. & Colls. (AGB), AGB Statement on 
Institutional Governance, in AGB STATEMENT ON INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE AND 
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Louis Menand recently described the modern American university as a 
product of the nineteenth century.
19
 In fact, its governance structure is  
older.  The use of lay boards dates back to the seventeenth century,  
although shared governance did not develop until the early twentieth.   
Harvard, the oldest American college, was modeled  on Emmanuel 
College of Cambridge University, at least with respect to curriculum and 
facilities.20
 
 When Harvard was founded in 1636, however, there were not 
enough scholars in Massachusetts Bay Colony to copy the English system 
of faculty governance.  The colonists instead put a lay governing board in 
charge of the college.21  This improvised governance structure was adopted 
in turn by the other colonial colleges, and remains the most common form 
of governance in American higher education.22 
At first, the use of lay governing boards did not influence American 
higher education.  As in Europe, faculty were hired only to teach, and the 
curriculum contained the same mix of scripture and classics that had been 
used in European higher education institutions for centuries.23  By the end 
of the Civil War, however, the mission of American colleges and 
universities began to change.  Leading college and university presidents 
 
GOVERNING IN THE PUBLIC TRUST: EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON COLLEGES AND 
UNIVERSITIES 1, 2 (2003) (―[T]he presence of lay governing boards is what 
distinguishes American higher education from most of the rest of the world . . . .‖). 
 19.  LOUIS MENAND, THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: REFORM AND RESISTANCE IN 
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 17 (2010). 
 20. Of the 100 graduates of Cambridge University who crossed the North Atlantic 
before 1646, thirty five were connected to Emmanuel College, including John Harvard.  
NORMAN SCARFE, CAMBRIDGESHIRE 94–95 (1983).    
 21. Harvard‘s oldest governing board, the Board of Overseers, which was 
established in 1642, was initially made up of public officials and ministers from 
neighboring towns. CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLES AND LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS 
RELATIVE TO THE BOARD OF OVERSEERS AND THE CORPORATION OF HARVARD 
UNIVERSITY 3–4 (1835), http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/2582402?op= 
n&n=1&treeaction=expand (last visited May 11, 2010).  In 1650, the colonists 
established the Harvard Corporation to oversee the college because the Board of 
Overseers was both too large and too difficult to assemble to govern effectively the 
ordinary business of the college.  SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, HARVARD COLLEGE IN THE 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 3–4 (1936).  The Corporation consisted of five fellows, the 
president, and the treasurer of Harvard—as it does today.  Harvard University, 
Governance of the University, http://www.news.harvard.edu/guide/underst/index.html 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2010).  Harvard is unusual in having two governing boards: the 
Corporation, which oversees most matters; and the Board of Overseers, which is 
consulted on major issues. Id. 
 22. Improvisation was not the only driving force.  The lay governing-board 
structure adopted at William and Mary was modeled in part on Scottish institutions, 
particularly the College of Edinburgh.  JURGEN HERBST, FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS:  
AMERICAN COLLEGE GOVERNMENT, 1636–1819, at 32.        
 23. CAROLINE WINTERER, THE CULTURE OF CLASSICISM: ANCIENT GREECE AND 
ROME IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL LIFE, 1780-1910, at 11–29 (2002). 
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and faculty increasingly sought to emulate German universities, 
particularly in their embrace of research as well as teaching.24  At the same 
time, the first Morrill Act, signed into law by President Lincoln in 1862, 
authorized the establishment of land-grant colleges and universities, which 
also were committed to scientific research—at least if the science was 
relevant to agriculture or to the mechanical arts.
25
  Clark Kerr best captured 
the nature of these two influences: 
The one was Prussian, the other American; one elitist, the other 
democratic; one academically pure, the other sullied by contact 
with the soil and the machine.  The one looked to Kant and 
Hegel, the other to Franklin, Jefferson, and Lincoln.  But they 
both served an industrializing nation.26 
Together, the confluence of these two developments also produced the 
modern American university.  The change in mission was accompanied by 
change in the membership of governing boards.  Historians still debate 
whether the earliest American colleges were public, private, or something 
else entirely.
27
   The thirty members of the Board of Overseers at Harvard, 
for example, were appointed by the state until 1865 when Massachusetts  
conferred the power to elect the overseers on the university‘s alumni.28  
The change of control at Harvard took place without much controversy.  At 
Yale, by contrast, the debate over whether alumni should control the 
governing board became a national issue that was discussed in many 
newspaper editorials and letters in national periodicals.
29
  Ultimately, the 
 
 24. The University of Berlin, founded in 1810 by Wilhelm von Humboldt, was the 
first university dedicated to research as well as teaching. WILLIAM CLARK, ACADEMIC 
CHARISMA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY 442–46 (2006); 3 A 
HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY IN EUROPE 4–5 (Walter Ruegg ed., 2004). 
 25. GEORGE RAINSFORD, CONGRESS AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 91–91, 101 (1972). 
 26. CLARK KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY 11–12 (1963). 
 27.  Compare JOHN S. WHITEHEAD, THE SEPARATION OF COLLEGE AND STATE:  
COLUMBIA, DARTMOUTH, HARVARD AND YALE, 1776-1876, at 45 (1973) (―a distinction 
between private and public or state institutions was not commonly recognized before 
the Civil War‖) with HERBST, supra note 22, at xi (the modern American configuration 
in which public and private institutions exist side by side ―emerged in the four decades 
before 1820‖). 
 28.  An Act in Relation to the Board of Overseers of Harvard College, 1865 Mass. 
Acts 565–67.   That same year, Cornell established a place for an alumnus on its 
governing board, although the first alumni trustee was not seated until 1874.  MORRIS 
BISHOP, A HISTORY OF CORNELL 77, 195 (1962). 
 29.  Peter Dobkin Hall, Noah Porter Writ Large?: Reflections on the 
Modernization of American Education and Its Critics, 1866-1916, in THE AMERICAN 
COLLEGE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 196. 211 (Roger L. Geiger, ed., 2000).  Hall 
concluded that the fight was a much about religion as it was about the role of the state:  
The stakes involved nothing less than the question of who should control 
American culture—the ministers who had reigned basically unchallenged 
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six state senators on the Yale governing board were replaced by trustees 
elected by the alumni.  The ten positions for ―successor trustees,‖ the self-
perpetuating part of the board, were opened to lay members at least in 
principle, although alumni did not become a majority of the board until 
1910.
30
  By early in the twentieth century, all major private colleges and 
universities were under lay control.
31
 
By constitutional authority in some states,
32
 and by statute in others,
33
 
most public institutions of higher education in the United States also are 
governed by lay boards.
34
 In Regents of the University of Michigan v. State 
of Michigan,
35
 for example, the state supreme court rejected as a violation 
of the state constitution the attempt of the state legislature to require the 
university‘s governing board to divest from companies doing business in 
South Africa.  The court also recounted the experience of the state when 
the legislature had entire control and management of the university, and 
noted that the result had been a university that ―was not a success.‖36  
When the Michigan Constitution of 1850 gave control of the university to a 
lay governing board, by contrast , the university grew ―to be one of the 
most successful, the most complete, and the best-known institutions of 
learning in the world.‖37  Governing boards thus have served as a buffer for 
public as well as private institutions of higher education in the United 
 
ever since the establishment of the first colleges, or the emergent class of 
businessmen and professionals who, as alumni, felt closely tied to the colleges 
and, as the people being asked to support them, felt that they were owed a 
voice in them.   
Id.     
 30.  Id. at 212.  The alumni took their revenge.  When Yale attempted to raise 
funds from the alumni in 1871, the effort was an abysmal failure.  Id. at 213.  
 31.  Id. at 213. 
 32.  See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9; GA. CONST. art. 8, § 4; MICH. CONST 1963 
art. 8 §§ 5 and 6.   See generally WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, 2 THE LAW 
OF HIGHER EDUCATION 1255-58 (4th ed. 2006).   
 33.  See, e.g., 110 ILCS 205/10; K.S.A. CONST. art. 6, § 2 (―The legislature shall 
provide for a state board of regents and for its control and supervision of public 
institutions of higher education‖); WYO. CONST. art, 7, § 17 (―The legislature shall 
provide by law for the management of the university, its lands and other property by a 
board of trustees.‖). 
 34.  Board members are selected in a variety of ways.  In Michigan the regents are 
elected state-wide. MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 15.  In California, they are appointed by the 
governor and confirmed by the Senate. CAL. CONST. art, 9, § 9. 
 35.  419 N.W. 2d 773 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). 
 36.  Id. at 776. 
 37.  Id.  State constitutions do not always protect state colleges and universities 
from state legislation.  See, e.g., Univ. of Utah v. Shurtleff, 144 P.3d 1109 (Utah 2006) 
(upholding right of state to prohibit university from barring possession of firearms on 
campus, and distinguishing the decision in University of Michigan v. State of Michigan 
on the ground that wording of Utah constitution differed from that of the Michigan 
constitution). 
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States from excessive government control.   
Of course, governing boards were not the only factor that led to a 
considerable degree of autonomy for American institutions of higher 
education.  As Alan Macfarlane has observed: 
A society or civilization to a certain extent gets the university it 
deserves.  If a society is open, balanced, and liberal, it will be 
reflected in that kind of university.  If it is closed, inquisitorial, 
centralized, it will get another kind.
38
   
The United States was founded on the principle of limited government.  
That belief is not only embedded in the Constitution, it is reflected in the 
major, federal programs that provide financial support to higher education.  
Thus the G.I. Bill, which provided funding for more than three million 
veterans to attend institutions of higher education, empowered individual 
students to decide which institution to attend.  This meant that federal funds 
went to the institutions chosen by students rather than by the government.  
The same approach was used in the National Defense Education Act of 
1958, the first of the post-war acts that provided significant financial aid to 
students at institutions of higher education.
39
      
B. Shared Governance 
 The United States not only developed a new form of governance for 
colleges and universities, both public and private, when it embraced lay 
governing boards—it also devised a new relationship between governing 
boards and their faculties.  The changing relationship with faculty began in 
the late nineteenth century.  As faculty members conducted more original 
research and developed expertise in a variety of disciplines, a number of 
clashes erupted between faculty members and trustees.  Those clashes, in 
turn, led to a new form of internal governance.    
One of the most publicized disputes involved Edward A. Ross, a 
prominent economist on the Stanford faculty.  His advocacy of free silver 
and opposition to the exploitation of foreign labor offended Mrs. Leland 
 
 38.  ALAN MACFARLANE, REFLECTIONS ON CAMBRIDGE 12–13 (2009).   
 39.  The Serviceman‘s Readjustment Act, 58 Stat. 284, codified as amended at 10 
U.S.C. § 16131, better known as the GI Bill, was signed into law on June 22, 1944, by 
President Roosevelt.  By 1947, there were 1,164,000 veterans registered for college 
using the G.I. Bill, nearly half of all enrolled students. MILTON GREENBERG, THE GI 
BILL: THE LAW THAT CHANGED AMERICA 36 (1997).  In 1972, Congress amended the 
1964 Higher Education Act to provide Basic Educational Opportunities Grants, soon 
renamed Pell Grants in honor of their Senate sponsor, to low-income students.  By 
1990, the program was providing 3 million students nearly $4 billion in aid. JOHN R. 
THELIN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 325 (2004).  See generally 
ALICE M. RIVLIN, THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN FINANCING HIGHER 
EDUCATION 61 (1961).   
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Stanford, the sole trustee of the university that she and her late husband had 
founded in memory of their son.  In 1897, she demanded that David Starr 
Jordan, then president of Stanford, fire Professor Ross.  President Jordan 
delayed as long as he could, but, in 1900, he capitulated.40   
In response to the Ross affair and a growing number of disputes between 
faculty members and governing boards at other institutions, both public and 
private, a group of leading scholars in 1915 organized the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP).41  That same year, the 
AAUP issued a Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Academic Tenure,
42
 which has come to be recognized as the seminal 
statement of academic freedom in the United States.43   
What is not as widely recognized is that the Declaration also endorsed a 
new approach to governance.  The Declaration credited the German 
concept of academic freedom as its inspiration, but in Germany no lay 
boards were interposed between the government and the faculty.  The state 
posed the most immediate threat to academic freedom.  In the United 
States, by contrast, the lay governing board at once offered faculty some 
insulation from governmental meddling and created a new source of 
interference with faculty control of  academic matters.  To protect 
American faculties  from overreaching by governing boards, the 
Declaration adopted a broader form of academic freedom, one that rested 
on a new allocation of governance responsibilities within colleges and 
universities.  This allocation has come to be known as ―shared 
governance‖: 
A university is a great and indispensable organ of the higher life 
of a civilized community, in the work of which the trustees hold 
an essential and highly honorable place, but in which the faculties 
hold an independent place, with quite equal responsibilities—and 
in relation to purely scientific and educational questions, the 
primary responsibility.44
 
 
 40. ORRIN LESLIE ELLIOTT, STANFORD UNIVERSITY: THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE 
YEARS 11 (1937); MARY O. FURNER, ADVOCACY & OBJECTIVITY: A CRISIS IN THE 
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1865-1905, at 233–39 (1975).  
 41. CHRISTOPHER JENCKS & DAVID RIESMAN, THE ACADEMIC REVOLUTION 15–20 
(1968); LAWRENCE R. VESEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 384–
418 (1965). 
 42.  AM. ASS‘N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, GENERAL DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, 
reprinted in 2 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 860, 860 
(Richard Hofstadter & Wilson Smith eds., 1961) [hereinafter 1915 DECLARATION].  
 43. See, e.g., Robert Post, The Structure of Academic Freedom, in ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 61, 64 (Beshara Doumani ed., 2006) (the 
Declaration is ―arguably the greatest articulation of the logic and structure of academic 
freedom in America.‖).    
 44. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 42 at 866.  
Do Not Delete 5/19/2010  11:30 AM 
700 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW [Vol. 36, No. 3 
 
The Declaration justified this new approach to governance on the 
pragmatic ground that shared governance is the best way for an institution 
to promote ―[g]enuine boldness and thoroughness of inquiry.‖45  It warned 
of the danger of ―a tyranny of public opinion‖ in any democracy, and 
explained that a college or university must be a refuge from such tyranny, 
―an intellectual experiment station, where new ideas can germinate and 
where their fruit, though still distasteful to the community as a whole, may 
be allowed to ripen.‖46  If trustees were to hold the power to decide what is 
taught and written, the Declaration warned, the institution would be more 
an instrument of propaganda than a true university.47   
The contours of shared governance were further refined by leading 
higher-education associations.  In 1966, the AAUP issued a Statement on 
Government of Colleges and Universities, which had been formulated 
jointly with the American Council of Education, the professional 
association of college and university presidents.48  The Statement explored 
 
 45. Id. at 862.  Some colleges and universities involved faculty in governance of 
academic matters decades earlier.  Jeremiah Day, for example, who was president of 
Yale from 1817 to 1846, discussed and decided all questions connected with college 
policy in meetings of the faculty. RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 235 (1955).      
 46. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 43, at 870.  A recent example of the pressure 
public opinion can bring to bear on an institution‘s governing board took place at the 
University of Nebraska.  On November 20, 2009, the Board of Regents by a 4-to-4 vote 
defeated an effort to limit human embryonic stem cell research at the university.  
Monica Davey, U. of Nebraska Defeats Tighter Limits on Stem Cell Research, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2009, at A12.  The measure was defeated only because of a change-of-
heart by a regent who had been backed by anti-abortion groups in his campaign to be 
elected to the board.  Nebraska is one of the few states where regents are elected in 
state-wide elections.  Scott Jaschik, Narrow Win for Stem Cell Research, INSIDE 
HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 23, 2009, http://www.insidehighered.com/layout/set/print/news/ 
2009/11/23/nebraska (last visited Mar. 1, 2010). 
 47. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 43, at 870.   
 48. AM. ASS‘N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1966 STATEMENT OF GOVERNMENT OF 
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, reprinted in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 
135–40 (10th ed. 2006) [hereinafter 1966 STATEMENT].  In addition, the board of 
directors of the Association of Governing Boards (AGB) encouraged institutions and 
their boards to consider the 1966 Statement.  ASS‘N OF GOVERNING BDS .OF UNIVS. & 
COLLS., STATEMENT ON BOARD ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (2007), available at 
http://agb.org/sites/agb.org/files/u16/AGB%20Statement%20on%20Board%20 
Accountability.pdf (last visited May 11, 2010) (Noting that ―[a]mong th[e] abiding 
values [of higher education] are self-regulation and autonomy, academic freedom and 
due process, shared governance, educational quality, transparency and fiscal 
integrity.‖).  The 2007 Statement added that ―[t]he faculty and academic 
administrators—not the board—shape the manner in which subjects are taught and 
learning experiences framed, identify who shall teach these programs, and develop 
approaches to assess the outcomes of student learning.‖  Id. at 7.  See also ASS‘N OF 
GOVERNING BDS. OF UNIVS. & COLLS., EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BOARDS: A GUIDE FOR 
MEMBERS OF GOVERNING BOARDS OF INDEPENDENT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 4 
(2009) (―[T]he tradition of shared governance [is] integral to the academic 
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the benefits of shared governance and explained the need for joint efforts 
by the key constituencies:  
The variety and complexity of the tasks performed by institutions 
of higher education produce an inescapable interdependence 
among governing board, administration, faculty, students, and 
others.  The relationship calls for adequate communication 
among these components, and full opportunity for appropriate 
joint planning and effort.49 
The Statement identified major activities that would benefit from joint 
effort, including framing and executing long-range plans, decisions 
regarding existing or prospective physical resources, budgeting, and 
selection of a new president.50  It also outlined the distinctive roles of 
governing boards, faculties, and administrators.  Governing boards, in 
addition to being responsible for the matters that need joint work, should 
husband the endowment, obtain needed capital and operating funds, and 
pay attention to personnel policy.51  Faculty should have primary 
responsibility for academic matters, including ―curriculum, subject matter 
and methods of instruction, research, faculty status, and those aspects of 
student life that relate to the educational process.‖52  Giving the faculty 
primary responsibility for academic matters, the Statement explained, 
means that presidents and boards should overrule faculty decisions about 
academic matters ―only in exceptional circumstances, and for reasons 
communicated to the faculty.‖53   
Although governing boards were acknowledged to be the ―final 
institutional authority,‖ the Statement urged them to undertake appropriate 
self-limitation.  An effective board, ―while maintaining a general overview, 
entrusts the conduct of administration to the administrative officers—the 
president and deans—and the conduct of teaching and research to the 
faculty.‖54 
In 1980, the Supreme Court acknowledged the value of shared 
governance in NLRB v. Yeshiva University.55  In the course of deciding that 
the faculty at Yeshiva could not organize as a union because their 
managerial responsibilities meant that they were not ordinary employees, 
the Court explained:  
The ―business‖ of a university is education, and its vitality 
 
community‖).   
 49. 1966 STATEMENT, supra note 48, at 136. 
 50. Id. at 136–37. 
 51. Id. at 138. 
 52. Id. at 139. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 138. 
 55. 444 U.S. 672 (1980). 
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ultimately must depend on academic policies that largely are 
formulated and generally are implemented by faculty governance 
decisions.  .  .  .  The university requires faculty participation in 
governance because professional expertise is indispensable to the 
formulation and implementation of academic policy.56 
Academic leaders also have addressed the strengths and weaknesses of 
shared governance.  In 1934, A. Lawrence Lowell, then president of 
Harvard University, explained that because colleges and universities are 
established not to earn profits, but to preserve, transmit and increase 
knowledge, the relationship of board to faculty should not be one of 
employer to employee, but one of mutual cooperation for ―the promotion of 
the scholar‘s work.‖57  Although some presidents have advocated a more 
corporate style of management,58  most have concluded that assigning 
faculty primary responsibility for academic matters is the best way to 
strengthen their commitment to the production and dissemination of 
knowledge.  In the words of Derek Bok: 
No one ever raised the level of scholarship by ordering professors 
to write better books, nor has the quality of teaching ever 
improved by telling instructors to give more interesting classes.  
In these domains, good work depends on the talent and 
enthusiasm of professors.59
 
  
Shared governance is not without its faults.  Faculty senates can be slow 
to respond even to time-sensitive matters or dominated by petty debate.  
But its merits have led to its adoption by a majority of American 
institutions of higher education.  A 2001 survey found that faculty 
participation in the governance of academic matters has increased 
significantly in recent decades.  In 1970, faculties determined the content of 
the curriculum at 45.6% of the 1,321 surveyed institutions, and they shared 
authority over the curriculum with the administration at another 36.4%.  By 
 
 56. Id. at 688–89 (footnote omitted). 
 57. A. Lawrence Lowell, The Relation Between Faculties and Governing Boards, 
in AT WAR WITH ACADEMIC TRADITIONS IN AMERICA 288–90 (photo. reprint 1970) 
(1934). 
 58. See, e.g., James  J. Duderstadt, Fire, Ready, Aim! University Decision-Making 
During an Era of Rapid Change, in GOVERNANCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION:  THE 
UNIVERSITY IN A STATE OF FLUX 26 (Werner Z. Hirsch & Luc E. Weber eds., 2001). 
 59. DEREK BOK, 2006-07 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE HARVARD CORPORATION, 
available at http://harvardmagazine.com/breaking-news/president-boks-annual-report 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2009). Bok added:  
It is certainly true that professors can resist change and that, like most human 
beings, they are often loath to give up their prerogatives.  For all that, 
however, American universities have fared quite well over the past 50 years, 
the very period when faculty power reached its zenith.   
Id. 
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2001, faculties determined curriculum content at 62.8% of the institutions, 
and shared authority at an additional 30.4%.60
  
Similarly, by 2001, faculties 
determined the appointment of full-time faculty in 14.5% and shared 
authority in 58.2% of the surveyed institutions.61  Shared governance, as a 
refinement of the governing board structure used by both public and private 
institutions of higher education, has become the norm at the very time that 
American higher education has been recognized as including the lion‘s 
share of the best colleges and universities in the world.62   
Shared governance should not be confused with divided governance.  It 
gives faculties primary—not exclusive—responsibility for academic 
matters.  As the 1966 Statement on Government recognized, there are times 
when a governing board should override a faculty decision.63  Similarly, 
although governing boards have primary responsibility for financial 
matters, it is normally best to consult with the faculty about, or include 
representatives of the faculty in, the decision-making process for financial 
and other matters that will directly affect the  ability of faculty to research 
or to teach, such as the budget, strategic planning, and the construction of 
new academic facilities.64 
Shared governance applies only to academic matters, moreover.  As a 
result most colleges and universities have a dual-management structure.  
There is a fairly horizontal relationship among governing board, 
administration, and faculty when academic matters are at issue.  The 
traditional ―pyramidal hierarchy‖ characteristic of for-profit corporations, 
by contrast, applies to board oversight of administrators and staff.65  It also 
applies to oversight of faculty when nonacademic matters are at issue.  A 
 
 60. Gabriel E. Kaplan, How Academic Ships Actually Navigate, in GOVERNING 
ACADEMIA 165, 172, 202 (Ronald G. Ehrenberg ed., 2004).  Faculty participation varies 
significantly by type of institution.  ―In for-profits the faculty are quite clearly 
employees, few faculty are involved in creating curriculum, and decision making of all 
sorts is firmly in the hands of managers.‖  Brian Pusser & Sarah E. Turner, Nonprofit 
and For-Profit Governance in Higher Education, in GOVERNING ACADEMIA 235, 251. 
 61. Kaplan, supra note 60 at 202.   
 62. See supra, note 8 and accompanying text.     
 63. 1966 STATEMENT, supra note 48, at 139.     
 64. Id. at 137.  Specifically, the statement reasoned that:  
The allocation of resources among competing demands is central in the 
formal responsibility of the governing board, in the administrative authority 
of the president, and in the educational function of the faculty.  Each 
component should therefore have a voice in the determination of short- and 
long-range priorities, and each should receive appropriate analyses of past 
budget experience, reports on current budgets and expenditures, and short- 
and long-range budgetary projections.  
Id. 
 65. Cf. NLRB. v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 680 (1980) (―The [National Labor 
Relations] Act was intended to accommodate the type of management-employee 
relations that prevail in the pyramidal hierarchies of private industry.‖). 
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faculty member, for example, cannot invoke academic freedom as a 
justification for not teaching his or her classes, or for demanding better 
health benefits.66   
The American use of lay governing boards protects the independence of 
the nation‘s colleges and universities from state control and, refined by the 
adoption of shared governance, has been a major force in producing the 
best higher education sector in the world.  It takes more than a particular 
governance structure, however, to produce academic excellence.  The next 
section will analyze how American governing boards are held to account 
III. FORMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY: COMPETITION, REGULATION, AND  
 ACCREDITATION 
There are three forms of accountability that have shaped American 
higher education: competition, licensing, and accreditation. 
A. Competition 
Market competition has held American colleges and universities to 
account from the earliest decades of the nation,
67
 and it remains the most 
important form of accountability.  The institutional diversity that came to 
characterize American higher education led to robust competition for 
students, faculty, and funds by the twentieth century.  As explained by Ruth 
Simmons, president of Brown University:  
Another factor in the strength of U.S. higher education is the 
competition that its institutions enjoy with each other, and I don‘t 
mean on the athletic field.  We all compete for students, faculty, 
government grants, awards and prizes, philanthropic support, and 
rankings.  Those institutions that compete most successfully 
attract better students and more resources and, in so doing, they 
continue to improve, extending their success in more and more 
powerful ways.  Those institutions that are weaker may fall back 
and even go out of business.  Economists tell us that competition 
is good and that, under most circumstances, it leads to 
improvement.  Our competition relies on our differences, the 
advantages that we can establish, the niches that are uniquely 
ours.68 
 
 66. See, e.g., Smith v. Kent State Univ., 696 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding 
termination of a tenured professor who repeatedly refused to teach assigned classes). 
 67.  During the colonial period, there was little competition because each college 
was established in a separate colony until Queens College (Rutgers) was founded in 
1766.  Religious differences still limited most competition between Queens and 
Princeton.  HERBST, supra note 22, at 112.  
 68. Ruth J. Simmons, President, Brown University, Address at the Economics 
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  Institutional diversity has further contributed to the quality of American 
higher education by providing multiple settings in which to determine how 
best to educate different students and to stimulate research and innovation.  
A major source of the institutional diversity that characterizes American 
higher education is the existence of a strong private as well as a strong 
public sector.
69
  In the early years of the nation, however, it was not at all 
clear that the private sector would survive.   
 In 1779, the Pennsylvania legislature suspended the powers of the 
trustees of the (private) College of Philadelphia, changed its name to the 
University of the State of Pennsylvania, and appointed twenty-four new 
trustees, including six state officials.
70
  The legislature was responding in 
part to action taken by trustees of the college during the revolution.  Some 
trustees withdrew to the British lines, or to Great Britain itself.
71
  Of the 
three trustees who were members of the Continental Congress, one voted 
for the Declaration of Independence, one against, and one refrained from 
voting.
72
  Other trustees and their families remained on pleasant terms with 
the British army of occupation in Philadelphia in 1777 and 1778, and the 
Provost chose not to participate in any way in the movement for 
independence.
73
   
For nearly a decade, the original trustees of the college resisted the 
actions of the state until, in 1789, the legislature, whose membership had 
changed in intervening elections, acknowledged that its earlier actions 
violated state-law protections of private property, and restored the property 
of the college.
74
  For a brief time, the college and the university attempted 
to operate separately, but they merged in 1791 to form the (private) 
University of Pennsylvania.
75
    
 
Club of Washington, D.C., April 2, 2008, transcript available at 
http://brown.edu/Administration/President/letters/2007-2008/economic-club.pdf.    
69
 Although only 1700 of the 4300 institutions of higher education in the United States 
are public, the majority of post-secondary degrees are awarded by public institutions. 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 28, 2009, at 16.  Most students outside the United States 
attend public universities.  In Europe, only Portugal and Turkey have large private 
sectors in higher education.  Estermann & Nokkala, supra note 13, at 9.     
 70.  EDWARD POTTS CHEYNEY, HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
1740-1940, at 123–24 (1940). 
 71.  Id. at 119. 
 72.  Id.   
 73.  Id.   
 74.  Id. at 146–50.  A more dramatic confrontation involving higher education 
occurred in New York City in 1775 when hundreds of protestors armed with clubs 
threatened Myles Cooper, the president of Kings College (the precursor of Columbia 
University) for being a Tory.  Alexander Hamilton, a student at the college, detained 
the mob long enough for the president to escape.  RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 63–64 (2004). 
 75.  Id.  CHENEY, supra note 70, at 162–69. 
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A better-known challenge to private higher education took place in New 
Hampshire, although it grew out of an internal governance dispute rather 
than a state-initiated effort to seize control.  Clergyman Eleazor Wheelock 
established Dartmouth College at his own expense for the purpose of 
Christianizing Native Americans.
76
  Rev. Wheelock obtained a charter from 
the King of England in 1769 and raised money for the college from the 
English aristocracy.  The royal charter gave him the right to select his 
successor, and he named his son, John.
77
  By the early nineteenth century, 
the original trustees had been replaced with new ones who were both less 
deferential to and more conservative religiously than the president.
78
 In 
1814, this board refused to permit President John Wheelock to teach his 
traditional course to seniors in the college.
79
 This was the last straw for the 
embattled college president.  When President Wheelock complained to the 
legislature about his treatment, the trustees fired  him.
80
   
Wheelock then reached out for support to the Jeffersonian Republicans, 
who for the first time in 1816 had captured New Hampshire‘s governorship 
and a majority in the state legislature.  The reconstituted legislature passed 
a statute to turn (private) Dartmouth College into (public) Dartmouth 
University.
81
  A companion statute authorized a fine of $500 if any trustee 
interfered with the new university‘s operations.82  The trustees concluded 
that they had no choice but to sue.  They lost in the state courts and 
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.     
With Chief Justice John Marshall writing, the Court in Trustees of 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward
83
 held that the college‘s charter was a 
contract protected under the Constitution‘s Contracts Clause from breach 
by the state.
84
  The trustees‘ victory kept Dartmouth private.  More 
importantly, The Dartmouth College Case has stood since as a bulwark 
protecting private colleges and universities from state expropriation and 
thus helped to preserve a private sector in American higher education. 
 The intense competition in higher education today for students, 
faculty, and funds means that governing boards need to be particularly 
careful of the reputation of their institution.  If a board fails to oversee the 
president adequately, an institution‘s reputation may be as damaged by 
 
 76.  Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 631 (1819). 
 77.  Id. at 632. 
 78.  HERBST, supra note 22, at 235. 
 79.  WHITEHEAD, supra note 27, at 54. 
 80.  Id. at 58–59. 
 81.  Id. at 63.  The statute is set forth in the official report of the case, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat).) 518, 539–44 (1819). 
 82.  WHITEHEAD, supra note 27, at 65. 
 83.  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
 84.  Id. at 654. 
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adverse publicity as by a civil complaint brought by the state attorney 
general.  Similarly, a board‘s failure to uphold academic standards in 
admissions or in the granting of degrees may lead to as much reputational 
harm as overpaying the president.85  A look at several of the most 
publicized recent controversies reveals the kinds of misjudgments that may 
lead to reputational harm.     
1. Board Failure to Oversee the President 
One of most-publicized recent failures of a governing board to oversee a 
president took place at American University.  The matter came to the 
attention of the media in July 2005, when The Washington Post received an 
anonymous letter.  It was a copy of a letter that had been sent a few months 
earlier to the board of trustees of American alleging ―severe expense 
account violations‖ by the university president and his wife.86  The letter 
claimed that they had charged the university for presents for their family, a 
personal French chef, long weekends in Europe that were not for university 
business, and daily wine for lunch and dinner at $50 to $100 per bottle.  
When outside auditors investigated the allegations, the chair of the board‘s 
audit committee learned that they were ―all basically true.‖87  After 
continuing, negative publicity, the Board voted to dismiss the president.88   
2. Board Failure to Resist Improper Intervention by State 
Officials or Major Donors 
 Colleges and universities understandably seek to be responsive to 
requests from major donors or state officials who have power over their 
funding.  Being responsive, however, does not justify granting academic 
favors to public officials, their relatives, or their friends.  Two recent and 
 
 85. The costs of scandal to a nonprofit college or university can be seen in the 
experience of several respected charities. In the 1990s, the president of the United Way 
was convicted of embezzling $600,000. See Karen W. Arenson, April 2–8: He Took at 
the Office, N.Y. TIMES, Apr, 9, 1995, Sec. 4, at 2.  A few years later the head of the 
United Way of the National Capital Area pleaded guilty to criminal fraud.  See 
generally Nicole Gilkeson, Note, For-profit Scandal in the Nonprofit World: Should 
States Force Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions onto Nonprofit Corporations?, 95 GEO. L.J. 
831 (2007).  After the fraud, private contributions to the United Way of the National 
Capital Area dropped by more than $30 million, resulting in a thirty percent reduction 
in total revenue.  The charity was forced to lay of forty percent of its workforce.  
Jacqueline L. Salmon, United Way’s Donations Plummet; Charity Will Cut 40% of 
Workforce, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2003, at A1. 
 86. Harry Jaffe, Let Them Eat Truffles, WASHINGTONIAN, April 2006, at 76.    
 87. Id. at 120.    
 88. Michael Janofsky, College Chief at American Agrees to Quit for Millions, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2005, at A20.  The president was later permitted to resign and 
provided with a generous settlement.  Id. 
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widely-publicized incidents demonstrate the high reputational price that 
institutions and their governing boards may pay if they fail to resist 
inappropriate requests from public officials or donors. 
a. The University of West Virginia and the Governor’s 
Daughter 
The controversy began on October 11, 2007, when a reporter from the 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette contacted West Virginia University (WVU) to 
confirm the credentials of the daughter of the governor of West Virginia, 
who had just been appointed chief operating officer of one of the world‘s 
largest generic drug companies.89  The company‘s chairman was a major 
contributor to the governor‘s campaign, as well as the University‘s largest 
donor, having given $20 million to the University in 2003.90  The 
University told the newspaper that the governor‘s daughter had earned an 
undergraduate degree at West Virginia University, but had not finished her 
executive MBA degree as she claimed on the company‘s website.  Days 
later, a University spokeswoman reported that the daughter had completed 
all of the requirements for the MBA degree, but simply had failed to pay a 
$50 graduation fee.  When pressed to explain its conflicting statements, the 
University said that the business school had failed to transfer some of her 
credits and grades to the records office.   
After a three-month investigation, a five-member Special Investigative 
Panel appointed by the University‘s provost and the Faculty Senate found 
that there had been no academic justification for granting the MBA degree 
to the daughter.91  They also found that University administrators had 
added courses and unearned grades to her record.92  When the report was 
released, the provost of the university and the dean of the business school 
resigned,93 and the chairman of the University‘s Board of Governors gave 
up his chairmanship.94  One month later the president of the University 
announced that he, too, would resign.95   
 
 89. Ian Urbina, University Investigates Whether Governor’s Daughter Earned 
Degree, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, at A15. 
 90. Id.   
 91. JOHN M. BURKOFF ET. AL, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE PANEL FOR 
REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE MBA PROGRAM RECORDS, Apr. 21, 2008, at 3, available at 
http://facultysenate.wvu.edu/r/download/15764 (last visited Nov. 27, 2009). 
 92. Id. at 6–8. 
 93. Patricia Sabatini and Len Boselovic, The Story of a Cover-up, PITTS. POST-
GAZETTE, May 4, 2008 at A1.  
 94. Paul Fain, Chairman of West Virginia U. Board Quits Post but Will Not Leave 
the Board, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 9, 2008,  
http://chronicle.com/article/Chairman-of-West-Virginia-U/40949/ (last visited  Nov. 
23, 2009). 
 95. Paul Fain, Questions Follow a Political President’s Fall, CHRON. HIGHER 
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b. Shadow Admissions at the University of Illinois 
On May 29, 2009, the Chicago Tribune reported that a ―shadow‖ 
admissions system existed at the University of Illinois, under which some 
well-connected applicants were admitted over the protests of admissions 
officers because the applicants were sponsored by state lawmakers or 
University trustees.96  The following month, the governor of Illinois, 
appointed an investigative commission chaired by Abner Mikva, a 
respected former federal judge and congressman, to investigate the 
matter.97  The Tribune later reported there were nearly one hundred 
instances where trustees had backed applicants in the past three years, 
―including their relatives and the children of colleagues and ‗key 
employees.‘‖98  According to the Tribune, every member of the board took 
part except for the newest trustee, who had been on the board for only one 
month.99  The chairman of the board resigned on August 3, 2009, and the 
investigative commission called on all politically-appointed trustees to do 
the same.100 
The Mikva Commission Report, released on August 6, 2009, concluded: 
For years, a shadow admissions process existed at the University 
of Illinois.  Unknown to the public and even to most University 
employees, this shadow process—referred to as ―Category I‖—
catered to applicants who were supported by public officials, 
University Trustees, donors, and other prominent individuals.  
While applicants who lacked such clout sought admission 
through the University‘s official admissions process, Category I 
applicants were given separate and often preferential treatment 
by University leadership. . . .  In scores of instances, the influence 
of prominent individuals—and the University‘s refusal or 
inability to resist that influence—operated to override the 
decisions of admission professionals and resulted in the 
enrollment of students who did not meet the University‘s 
 
EDUC., June 20, 2008, at A11.     
 96. Jodi S. Cohen, Stacy St. Clair, & Tara Malone, Clout Goes to College: Rezko 
Relative is Among Those Admitted to U. of I. in Shadow System Influenced by Trustees 
and Other Insiders, CHI. TRIB., May 29, 2009, at 1. 
 97. Karen Ann Cullotta, Panel to Investigate Admissions at U. of Illinois, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 2009, at A18.   
 98. Robert Becker, Tara Malone, & Jodi S. Cohen, Trustees No Strangers to 
Clout, CHI. TRIB., June 21, 2009, at 1. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Ashley C. Killough, Report Calls on All U. of Illinois Trustees to Resign, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 6, 2009, http://chronicle.com/article/Report-Calls-on-All-
U-of-I/47969 (last visited Nov. 23, 2009). 
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admissions standards—some by a considerable margin. . . .101 
The report found that, due to the advocacy of influential ―sponsors,‖ the 
University admitted in 2009 at least thirty-three Category I undergraduate 
applicants who had been designated for denial by the admissions 
officers.102  In addition, the College of Law admitted twenty-four 
substandard applicants between 2003 and 2007.103  
The report recommended that all members of the Board of Trustees 
submit their resignations in order to permit the governor to decide who 
should be reappointed.104  It also recommended establishing a firewall 
around the admissions process, which would prohibit consideration of 
sponsorship by prominent individuals or other undue influence in the 
admissions process.105  In September, the University president announced 
his resignation.106 
Competition has served as a powerful source of accountability for 
colleges and universities and for their governing boards even in the best of 
times.  As recent controversies demonstrate, trustees must be careful to act 
in ways that will not harm the reputation of their institution because 
applicants, faculty, and grantors may avoid an institution that develops a 
reputation for either academic or financial irregularities. 
B. Regulation 
1. Of Nonprofit Organizations Generally 
From the earliest days of the nation, regulation of American higher 
education has been viewed as a state rather than a federal responsibility.
107
  
The first regulations of the structure or governance of private institutions of 
higher education and of other nonprofit organizations were not 
promulgated, however, until after World War II.  Like most nonprofit 
organizations, if colleges or universities chose to incorporate in earlier 
years, they used the ―nonstock‖ provisions found in the general corporation 
 
 101. STATE OF ILLINOIS ADMISSIONS REVIEW COMMISSION, REPORT & 
RECOMMENDATIONS, Aug. 6, 2009, at 3, available at  http://admissionsreview. 
illinois.gov/documents/FinalReport.pdf. 
 102. Id. at 4. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 6. 
 105. Id. at 7. 
 106. Jodi  S. Cohen, Stacy St. Clair, & Tara Malone, University of Illinois President 
B. Joseph White Resigns, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24, 2009, available at 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-u-of-i-white-resign-24-sep24,0,161068.story 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2009).   
 107.  LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION:  THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
1783-1876, at 400–09 (1980).   
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law of many states.
108
  In 1952, a Model Non-Profit Corporation Act was 
developed by a committee of the American Bar Association.
109
  By 2003, 
the Model Act had prompted the adoption of nonprofit corporation acts in 
all but two states.
110
   
The nonprofit corporation acts divide the fiduciary obligations of 
nonprofit trustees into a duty of care and a duty of loyalty.
111
  The duty of 
care is essentially the same as the duty owed by directors of business 
corporations to their shareholders: a director must exercise ―that degree of 
skill or diligence, and care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise 
in similar circumstances.‖112  There are, however, significant differences 
between the duty of loyalty owed by for-profit directors and that owed by 
nonprofit trustees.  These differences reflect the different organizational 
purposes of for-profit and nonprofit corporations:     
The officers and directors of a for profit corporation are to be 
guided by their duty to maximize long term profit for the benefit 
of the corporation and the shareholders.  A nonprofit public 
benefit corporation‘s reason for existence, however, is not to 
generate a profit.  Thus a director‘s duty of loyalty lies in pursing 
or ensuring pursuit of the charitable purpose or public benefit 
which is the mission of the corporation.
113
 
 Nonprofit corporations by definition are precluded from distributing 
their surplus profits to those in charge of the organization, a prohibition that 
Henry Hansmann termed ―the nondistribution constraint.‖114  This 
 
 108.  Elizabeth A. Moody, Foreword, MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT xix 
(3d ed. 2009). 
 109.  Id.   
 110.  MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 152 
(2004).  In Delaware and Kansas, charitable corporations are governed by the business 
corporation act, but their articles of organization must both provide that the corporation 
is not created for profit and prohibit the distribution of dividends to shareholders.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 199–226.  
 112.  ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4 (1986).  Liability for violating the duty 
of care is limited by the business judgment rule: a director‘s business judgment cannot 
be attacked unless it ―was arrived at in a negligent manner, or was tainted by fraud, 
conflict of interest, or illegality.‖ Id. 
 113.  Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., 112 S.W.3d 486, 504 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 2002).   
 114.  Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 
(1980): 
A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred 
from distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise 
control over it, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees.  By ―net 
earnings‖ I mean here pure profits—that is, earnings in excess of the 
amount needed to pay for services rendered to the organization; in 
general, a nonprofit is free to pay reasonable compensation to any 
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definition of what it means to be a nonprofit has the virtue of being used in 
the nonprofit corporation statutes of all fifty states.
115
  State laws embody 
the constraint by providing that ―insiders,‖ including trustees, officers and 
donors, may not take advantage of their positions either by engaging in 
self-dealing transactions that benefit themselves at the expense of the 
mission of the nonprofit organization, or by approving or accepting 
excessive compensation.
116
   Most states also restrict their officeholders 
from receiving distributions of budgetary surpluses, which means that 
public colleges and universities also are subject to the nondistribution 
constraint.
117
 
 Significantly, the means of enforcing the duties of for-profit boards 
and nonprofit trustees are quite different.  In the for-profit sector, the 
possibility of a stockholder derivative action helps to ensure the board‘s 
accountability.  In the nonprofit sector, however, charitable corporations 
have no stockholders to bring such an action.  Most states, therefore, have 
enacted statutes authorizing the state attorney general to intervene when the 
board of a charitable organization fails to fulfill its duty of care or 
loyalty.
118
  It was this type of statute that authorized the action filed in New 
 
person for labor or capital he provides, whether or not that person 
exercises some control over the organization. . . .  I shall call [this 
prohibition on the distribution of profits] the ―nondistribution 
constraint.‖ 
 115.  Richard Steinberg & Walter W. Powell, Introduction to THE NONPROFIT 
SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 1 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d 
ed. 2006). 
 116.  American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations § 
310 Duty of Loyalty (Tentative Draft No. 1, March 19, 2007, tentatively approved at 
2007 and 2008 Annual Meetings):  
The duty of loyalty requires each board member, the governing board, and 
each committee of the board and committee member--  
(a) to act in a manner that such person or body reasonably believes to be 
in the best interests of the charity, in light of its stated purposes. . . . 
The Official Comment answers the question to whom fiduciary duties are owed:   
In a private (noncharitable) trust, trustees owe fiduciary duties to the 
beneficiaries; in a business corporation, the directors owe their duties to the 
corporation.  In the case of a charitable trust, which lacks ascertainable 
beneficiaries who can enforce their rights, the fiduciary duties are instead said 
to run to the charitable purpose. . . . 
. . . By using the phrase ―best interests of the charity, in light of its stated 
purposes,‖ this Section combines the trust and corporate language to 
declare an affirmative obligation of the fiduciaries to govern for 
charitable purposes, and not for the benefit of board members, 
executives, donors, or other private parties.  Of course, private 
individuals—such as students . . . will incidentally benefit from the 
charities activities. 
 117.  THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 115, at 2.   
 118.  The tradition of relying on government action to stop fraud in charitable 
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Jersey against Stevens Institute of Technology.
119
  
 The action was filed on September 17, 2009.
120
  Several counts of the 
complaint focused on actions that had been approved by only a minority of 
the board.  Specifically, the complaint alleged that the president and 
chairman of the board joined with the two vice-chairs of the board to 
―dictate the composition of most committees of the Board,‖ and otherwise 
to control the full board.
121
  Among the kinds of information that allegedly 
were not disclosed to the full board were the reasons 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers withdrew as outside auditor in 2005, the internal-
control letters of the independent auditors, the compensation of the 
president, and unauthorized loans to the president.
122
 
 To support the claim of excessive presidential compensation, the 
complaint alleged that, in fiscal year 2007, the president was paid $770,000 
to oversee operating expenses of $158 million.
123
  That same fiscal year, 
the president of MIT was paid $635,000 to oversee operating expenses of 
more than $2.3 billion.
124
  The complaint also alleged that when a 
 
organizations originated in seventeenth-century England.  See Kevin C. Robbins, The 
Nonprofit Sector in Historical Perspective: Traditions of Philanthropy in the West, in 
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 115, at 13 (discussing Statute of Charitable Uses 
of 1601 and the inquisitorial powers and procedures conveyed to local commissioners 
to combat fraud in charitable organizations).  
 119.  See supra text accompanying notes 1–2.  A decade ago, a similar action was 
brought against the trustees and officers of private Adelphi University.  It was brought 
by the New York Board of Regents rather than the Attorney General, however, because 
New York grants the Regents broad powers to oversee all academic institutions.  In 
1997, the trustees and officers of Adelphi filed a civil suit to prohibit the New York 
Board of Regents from conducting a hearing into the fitness of the board.   In re 
Adelphi University v. Board of Regents of the State of New York, 229 A.D.2d 36, 652 
N.Y.S. 2d 837 (1997).  The court held that the Regents had the necessary statutory 
authority to proceed.  After a full inquiry, the Regents removed eighteen of the nineteen 
Adelphi trustees.  The reconstituted Board of Trustees fired the president, whose 
compensation had triggered the Regents‘ initial inquiry.  His compensation had reached 
$837,113 in 1995 and included an option to purchase his $1.3 million apartment in 
Manhattan and an $82,000 Mercedes. Courtney Leatherman, Adelphi’s Former 
Trustees Reach Multimillion-Dollar Settlement with University, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
Nov. 27, 1998, at A34.  A 1998 settlement brought Adelphi University $1.23 million 
from the former trustees, and another $1.45 million from the insurance company that 
had indemnified them. David M. Halbfinger, Lawsuits Over Ouster of Adelphi Chief 
Are Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1998, at B14; William H. Honan, Campus in 
Turmoil: A Special Report; Adelphi, A Little University with Big Ideas, N.Y.TIMES, 
Feb. 5, 1997, at B1.  
 120.  Complaint, supra note 1; John Hechinger, New Jersey Sues Stevens Institute of 
Technology, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB125322955414021243.html (last visited May  11, 2010).    
 121.  Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 9, 32, 35.   
 122. Id. at ¶¶ 38, 40, 41, 332. 
 123.  Id. at ¶ 54. 
 124. Id. at ¶ 53. 
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compensation comparability analysis was first procured from an executive-
compensation firm in 2005, the president and other officers attempted to 
influence the consultant by arguing that universities with larger budgets 
and student bodies should be included in the list of peer schools used.  The 
compensation committee never provided the report of this consultant to the 
full board.
125
  A second consultant looked only at salary and bonus, and 
ignored the loans, loan forgiveness, housing, and tuition benefits that also 
were provided to the president.  When the president told the second 
consultant to alter the peer group used for comparison, moreover, the firm 
complied, and only the revised report of the second firm was given to the 
full board.
126
  Referencing the Chronicle of Higher Education, the 
complaint noted that the president‘s cash compensation alone made him the 
tenth highest paid university president in the United States, and that eight 
of the nine presidents with higher cash compensation were at schools with 
operating budgets that exceeded $1 billion.
127
 
 On January 15, 2010, a settlement was reached between Stevens 
Institute of Technology and the New Jersey Attorney General.
128
  In it, the 
Board agreed to a number of governance changes including a requirement 
that the entire board approve key compensation and investment decisions, 
improvements in the operations of Board committees, particularly Audit, 
Compensation, and Investment, and the appointment of a non-trustee 
financial expert to the Audit Committee.
129
  The president earlier had 
announced that he would leave his position on June 30, 2010.
130
 
 In the last decades of the twentieth century, after Congress approved 
large increases in the amount of federal loans and grants available for post-
secondary students,
131
 the federal government began to regulate some 
operations of colleges and universities.  It did so by placing conditions on 
their students‘ eligibility for federal financial aid.132  Another significant 
 
 125.   Id. at ¶¶ 375, 384. 
 126.  Id. at ¶¶ 390, 397, 408. 
 127. Id. at ¶¶ 435, 438. 
 128.  Settlement in Milgram v. Trustees of the Stevens Institute of Technology, 
available at http://stevens.edu/sit/board-of-trustees-statement.cfm (last visited May 11, 
2010).   
 129.  Id.   
 130.  Letter from Lawrence T Babbio, Chairman of the Board of Trustees and 
Harold J Raveche, President, Stevens Institute of Technology, Jan. 15, 2010, available 
at http://www.stevens.edu/pdf/LB_HR_Statement.pdf (last visited May 11, 2010); 
Stevens Institute’s President Will Resign as Part of Settlement with New Jersey, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 15, 2010, http://chronicle.com/blogPost/Stevens-Institutes-
Preside/20548/ (last visited May 11, 2010).    
 131.  See supra note 39.   
 132.  See, e.g., Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–
1688 (prohibiting federal funding of students in educational institutions that 
discriminate on the basis of sex in education programs or activities); the Family 
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source of federal regulation of colleges and universities is the tax code.  
Colleges and universities are not commonly thought of as charities, but the 
federal tax code includes them in its definition of ―charitable 
organizations‖ eligible for tax relief.133   
 There are two primary forms of federal tax relief provided to qualified 
charities.  Since the enactment of the federal income tax in 1913, the 
United States has exempted the income of all qualified charitable 
organizations from federal taxation.
134
  In addition, since 1917, the United 
States has provided an income tax deduction to individual and corporate 
donors to qualified charities.
135
  Together, these two provisions provided 
more than $40 billion in tax relief to the nonprofit sector in 2001.
136
  
Approximately 10% of this amount, or $4 billion, went to higher 
education.
137
      
 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (prohibiting 
federal funding of students in educational institutions that have a policy or practice of 
releasing education records to unauthorized persons); and the Clery Act, 20 U.S.C. § 
1092(f) (prohibiting federal funding of  students in education institutions that do not 
notify their constituent communities of certain crimes). 
 133.  The confusion produced by the difference between the legal and the common 
meaning of the word ―charitable‖ was first noted by Lord MacNaghten in 
Commissioners v. Pemsel, A.C. 531, 583 (1891).   The legal meaning of ―charitable 
organizations‖ is rooted in the Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601, Stat. 43 Eliz., c.4, 
which included in its definition of charitable purposes, relief for the aged and poor, 
schools of learning, free schools, scholars in universities, and churches.  Thus, 
educational organizations are not required to aid the poor in order to qualify as 
charitable organizations under the tax code.  In 1983, the Supreme Court held that the 
exemption may be denied, however, if a charitable organization is violating public 
policy.  Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (upholding denial of tax-
exempt status to university because of its racially discriminatory policy).     
 134.  I.R.C. § 501 (c) ()(3); see generally DARRYLL JONES ET AL., THE TAX LAW OF 
CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (2003).  States provide 
comparable tax benefits to qualified organizations and donors.  See, e.g., Yale Univ. v. 
Town of New Haven, 42 A. 87 (Conn. 1899) (holding section 3820 of the Connecticut 
General Statutes makes colleges, academies, churches, and public school houses or 
infirmaries tax exempt).  See generally John D. Colombo, Why is Harvard Tax-
Exempt? (And Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption for Private Educational Institutions,), 
35 ARIZ. L. REV. 841, 855–56 (1993) (―state tax exemption tends to follow the federal 
pattern‖).  In addition, states exempt educational institutions from property taxes.  See 
City of Washington v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 704 A.2d 120 (Penn. 1997) 
(upholding property tax exemption of Washington & Jefferson College).  See generally 
William R. Ginsberg, The Real Property Tax Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations: A 
Perspective, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 291 (1980).       
 135.  I.R.C. § 170 (a).  Some nonprofit corporations, such as private clubs and 
unions, are exempt from taxes on the income that they generate, but are not eligible to 
receive tax-deductible charitable contributions.  I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(7) and (c)(5).   
 136. John Simon, Harvey Dale & Laura Chisolm, The Federal Tax Treatment of 
Charitable Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra 
note 115, at 267, 271. 
 137.  From July 2007 through June 2008, $31.6 billion was given to higher 
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The federal tax code also reinforces the nondistribution constraint by (1) 
a proscription against ―inurement,‖138 (2) a proscription against more than 
incidental private benefit, and (3) rules imposing taxes on excess-benefit 
transactions.
139
  The proscription against inurement applies to benefits 
received by ―insiders.‖140  The private-benefit proscription, by contrast, 
applies to benefits received by anyone unless the benefits are incidental.
141
  
Finally, since 1996, the tax code has provided for penalty excise taxes to be 
imposed on any insider who receives an ―excess benefit‖ from a qualified 
charity, and on any ―organization manager‖ who knowingly participates in 
the transaction.
142
  
2. Higher Education Licensing Laws 
In addition to the state corporate law requirements and federal tax 
benefits available to nonprofit corporations generally, most states also have 
laws that apply specifically to higher education.  Because most applicants 
and their families are not in a good position to evaluate the academic 
quality of colleges and universities, many states decided that some form of 
consumer protection was needed.  Most turned to licensing, the same 
approach used to protect the public from unqualified doctors, lawyers, and 
other professionals. 
The move toward licensing began toward the end of the nineteenth 
century when concern escalated about diploma mills that were preying on 
the unwary.143  In 1897, the National Education Association asked states to 
exercise some supervision over degree-conferring institutions in order to 
bar diploma mills.144  One of the first fruits of this call for regulation was a 
licensing law adopted in New Jersey in 1912 and signed into law by 
 
education in the United States.  GIVING USA FOUNDATION, GIVING USA 2009: THE 
ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2008, at 97 (2009).  This was 
slightly more than 10% of the total charitable giving that year. Id. at 4. 
 138.  The term was first used in 1909 to preclude exempting from an excise tax any 
―part of the net income [of charitable organizations,] which inures to the benefit of any 
private stockholder or individual.‖  THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 115, at 282. 
 139.  Id. at 281 (―The proscriptions against private inurement and more-than-
incidental private benefits and the . . . rules imposing sanctions on ―excess benefit‖ 
transactions parallel the state-based duty of loyalty rules that regulate and punish 
fiduciaries‘ self-dealing and diversion of a charity‘s financial assets to themselves.‖). 
 140.  See I.R.C. §501(c)(3).  ―Insider‖ was defined in 1996 to mean ―any person 
who was . . . in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the 
organization.‖  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)).).  Authorities agree that the inurement 
proscription does not prevent the payment of reasonable compensation for goods or 
services.  Simon et al., supra note 136, at 282. 
 141.  IRS Gen. Couns. Mem. 39862 (Nov. 21, 1991). 
 142.  I.R.C. § 4958; see also Simon et al., supra note 136, at 283. 
 143. ROBERT H. REID, AMERICAN DEGREE MILLS 12 (1959).  
 144. Id. at 13. 
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Woodrow Wilson during his brief tenure as governor between his years as 
president of Princeton and as president of the United States.  In Shelton 
College v. State Board of Education,145 the New Jersey Supreme Court 
upheld the New Jersey licensing law, and explained that, as useful as 
private accreditation is, ―it cannot deal directly with the nonaccredited 
school.  It cannot stop the substandard school or close the out-and-out 
degree mill.‖146  For those problems, licensing is needed.  Shelton College 
asserted that the licensing statute violated its First Amendment rights.  The 
court disagreed; it described the privilege of granting a degree as 
―intimately related‖ to the public welfare and thus unquestionably subject 
to state regulation.147  The law did not violate the First Amendment, the 
court explained, because licensing did not turn on the content of what the 
college taught but on the granting of degrees.  The college‘s assertion that 
the Constitution guaranteed an absolute right to bestow the degree of 
Bachelor of Arts was dismissed as simply ―untenable.‖148  
A similar conclusion was reached in Nova University v. Educational 
Institution Licensure.149  The court there explained that, by 1929, the 
District of Columbia had become the ―capital‖ for practically all diploma 
mills in the United States and the world.150  ―Hundreds of fraudulent 
institutions of ‗learning‘ incorporated in the District and sold degrees from 
baccalaureate to doctoral in every conceivable field of study with little or 
no academic work.‖151  They also sold their charters to individuals who ran 
diploma mills in other states and other countries.152  In response, Congress 
enacted a statute requiring degree-granting institutions incorporated or 
operating in the District to be licensed.153  Like Shelton College, Nova 
University claimed applying that the licensing statute to its program 
violated its First Amendment right to free speech.  Citing Shelton, the D.C. 
Court of Appeals rejected Nova‘s challenge.154  
Despite the licensing requirements imposed by most states, diploma 
mills remain a serious problem.  In 2008, for example, a couple pleaded 
guilty to mail and wire fraud after a federal investigation into their diploma 
mill, most often called St. Regis University, which had churned out more 
 
 145. 226 A.2d 612 (N.J. 1967). 
 146. Id. at 619. 
 147. Id. at 618 (quoting ELLIOTT, THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS 200 (1930)).   
 148. 226 A.2d at 620. 
 149. 483 A.2d 1172 (D.C. Ct. App. 1984). 
 150. Id. at 1176. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.   
 153. Pub. L. No. 70-949, § 586a, 45 Stat. 1504 (1929).   
 154. 483 A.2d at 1181. 
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than 10,000 diplomas for customers in 131 countries.155  Among their 
customers were more than 350 federal employees, including the deputy 
undersecretary for personnel and readiness at the Defense Department, who 
was charged with overseeing two million Pentagon employees.156   
It is evident that more needs to be done to stop diploma mills.157  As a 
step in the right direction, the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA) 
of 2008, in order to ―prevent, identify, and prosecute diploma mills,‖ 
mandated better collaboration among the Secretary of Education and the 
United States Postal Service, the Federal Trade Commission, the 
Department of Justice (including the Federal Bureau of Investigation), the 
Internal Revenue Service, and the Office of Personnel Management.158  It 
will take more than collaboration, however, to police diploma mills 
effectively.  Both states and the federal government need to devote 
resources to the problem.
159
  
Regulating the minimum quality of higher education, moreover, as 
licensing does, does nothing to improve academic quality at institutions 
that meet state minimum standards.  Fortunately, a new mechanism was 
developed in the United States to raise academic quality without increasing 
the role of government: accreditation. 
 
 155. Diana Jean Schemo, Diploma Mill Concerns Extend Beyond Fraud, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 29, 2008, Sec. 1 at 4. 
 156. Id. In 2004, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), at the request of 
Congress, investigated whether federal funds had been used to pay for degrees from 
diploma mills, and whether federal employees holding senior-level positions had 
obtained degrees from them. Diploma Mills: Federal Employees Have Obtained 
Degrees from Diploma Mills and Other Unaccredited Schools, Some at Government 
Expense:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004) 
(statement of Robert J. Cramer, Managing Director, Office of Special Investigations, 
GAO), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04771t.pdf (last visited May 11, 
2010).  The GAO searched the Internet for unaccredited schools that offered degrees 
for a relatively-low fee, awarded credits on the basis of life experience, and did not 
require any classroom instruction.  Id. at 1.  Three of the four unaccredited schools they 
investigated provided records that identified 463 purchasers of their degrees who were 
employed by the federal government.  Id. at 2.  One was employed in a senior position 
at the Department of Homeland Security. Id. 
 157. See generally ALLEN EZELL & JOHN BEAR, DEGREE MILLS: THE BILLION-
DOLLAR INDUSTRY THAT HAS SOLD OVER A MILLION FAKE DIPLOMAS (2005). 
 158. Pub. L. No. 110-315, 122 Stat. 3098 (2008). 
 159.  On January 28, 2010, Representative Timothy Bishop, a Democrat from New 
York, introduced the Diploma and Accreditation Integrity Protection Act, HR 4535.  It 
is co-sponsored by Michael N. Castle, a Republican from Delaware.  The bill would 
direct the Federal Trade Commission to take action against diploma mills and 
accreditation mills, and report its findings to the Department of Education. Thomas 
Bartlett, New Bill in Congress Would Make Diploma Mills a Federal Concern, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 29, 2010, http://chronicle.com/article/New-Bill-in-Congress-
Would-/63776/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).   
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C. Accreditation 
Most nations have a ministry of education that sets national standards for 
their institutions of higher education.  The United States, by contrast, 
developed its own system for ensuring and improving academic quality, 
one that was designed to protect the autonomy of colleges and universities 
from government control  Accreditation, the American approach, relies on 
private, voluntary associations that use peer review to accredit institutions 
of higher education.160  At the heart of the system are six regional 
associations that accredit institutions in their geographic areas.161  There are 
also a number of specialized accreditors, such as the Section of Legal 
Education and Admission to the Bar of the American Bar Association, 
which accredits law schools.   
The New England Association, established in 1885, is the oldest of the 
regional accreditors, although it did not begin formally accrediting 
institutions until 1952.162  By contrast, the North Central Association, 
which was established in 1895, issued its first list of accredited institutions 
in 1913.163   
The need for a comprehensive approach to accreditation became 
apparent in 1912,  when the University of Berlin announced that, for 
purposes of admission to its graduate programs, it would recognize 
American undergraduate degrees only if they were from members of the 
Association of American Universities (AAU).  Other universities in 
Germany and Holland soon adopted the same policy.164  Charles Eliot, then 
president of Harvard, a member of the AAU, took the position that the 
Association should either justify the confidence being placed in it by 
foreign universities, or notify them that there were American institutions 
outside the Association whose work and standing were not inferior to those 
who were members.165  As in a game of hot potato, responsibility for 
accreditation was passed around for a number of years.  The AAU 
 
 160. The New York Board of Regents, which is a public body, is an exception to 
this pattern.  It was established in 1787. Its members at first were required to visit every 
college in the state and to report on them annually to the legislature.  WILLIAM K. 
SELDEN, ACCREDITATION:  A STRUGGLE OVER STANDARDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 30 
(1960). 
 161. The six are the New England Association of Schools and Colleges, the Middle 
States Association of Colleges and Schools, the Southern Association of Colleges and 
Schools Commission on Colleges, the Higher Learning Commission of the North 
Central Association of Colleges and Schools, the Northwest Commission on Colleges 
and Universities, and the Western Association of Colleges and Schools. 
 162. SELDEN, supra note 160, at 30, 37.   
 163. Id. at 31, 37.   
 164. GEORGE F. ZOOK & M. E. HAGGERTY, THE EVALUATION OF HIGHER 
INSTITUTIONS 34 (1936).   
 165. Id. 
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concluded that it did not want the responsibility of accrediting colleges and 
universities.  An earlier effort by the United States Bureau of Education (a 
precursor of the present Department of Education) to take on the task was 
stopped by President Taft after widespread public criticism of the Bureau‘s 
proposal.166  The American Council on Education (ACE) took up the 
responsibility for accreditation in 1921, but abandoned it in 1935.167  
Ultimately, accreditation was left to the regional accreditors.  Since 1996, 
the private Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) has 
coordinated the work of the six regional accreditors as well as many of the 
specialized accreditation bodies.
168
  CHEA today is the largest institutional 
membership organization of higher education in the United States, with 
some 3,000 degree-granting colleges and universities as members.
169
 
Accreditation, in contrast to licensing, was designed to provide quality 
improvement as well as quality assurance.170  To achieve both goals, 
 
 166. Id. at 21. 
 167. Id. at 41, 43. 
 168.  Harland Bloland has chronicled the rather tumultuous history that led to the 
establishment of CHEA.  HARLAND G. BLOLAND, CREATING THE COUNCIL FOR HIGHER 
EDUCATION ACCREDITATION (2001).  The higher-education community was extremely 
hesitant at first to organize a national body to coordinate the work of the various 
accreditors, but came to realize that the alternative was likely to be more regulation by 
either the states or the federal government. 
 169.  Letter from Judith S. Eaton, President, Council For Higher Education 
Accreditation, to Colleagues (October 2006), available at http://www.chea.org/pdf/ 
PrezLtr_DegMills_1006.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2009). 
 170. JUDITH S. EATON, AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. ACCREDITATION (2009), available at 
http://www.chea.org/pdf/2009.06_Overview_of_US_Accreditation.pdf. See, e.g., 
Middle State Commission on Higher Education: Mission, Vision, & Core Values, 
http://www.msche.org/?Nav1=ABOUT&Nav2=MISSION (last visited May 11, 2010) 
(―The Middle States Commission on Higher Education is a voluntary, non-
governmental, membership association that is dedicated to quality assurance and 
improvement through accreditation via peer evaluation.‖). See also Western 
Association of Schools and Colleges: Purposes of WASC Accreditation, 
http://www.wascsenior.org/node/247 (last visited May 11, 2010): 
The accreditation process is aimed at: Assuring the educational community, 
the general public, and other organizations and agencies that an accredited 
institution has demonstrated it meets the Commission‘s Core Commitments to 
Institutional Capacity and Educational Effectiveness, and has been 
successfully reviewed under Commission Standards; Promoting deep 
institutional engagement with issues of educational effectiveness and student 
learning, and developing and sharing good practices in assessing and 
improving the teaching and learning process; Developing and applying 
Standards to review and improve educational quality and institutional 
performance, and validating these Standards and revising them through 
ongoing research and feedback; Promoting within institutions a culture of 
evidence where indicators of performance are regularly developed and data 
collected to inform institutional decision making, planning, and improvement; 
Developing systems of institutional review and evaluation that are adaptive to 
institutional context and purposes, that build on institutional evidence and 
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accreditors rely on self-studies and peer evaluation.  The accrediting 
organization recruits a team of faculty and administrative peers to visit an 
institution being accredited (or reaccredited).  Team members are all 
volunteers and, typically, uncompensated.  The institution being visited 
prepares a self-study that summarizes how well it thinks it is meeting the 
standards of the accrediting organization.  The self-study is followed by a 
multi-day visit by the accreditation team to the college or university, which 
includes meetings with faculty, administrators, and students, attending 
classes, and inspection of facilities.  After the visit, the team prepares a 
detailed report on the institution based on what was learned during the visit 
and other information provided by the school.  The site team report is then 
used by the accrediting body to decide whether to accredit (or reaccredit) 
the school.171  In contrast to licensing under which an institution is simply 
either granted or denied a license, accreditation provides more guidance to 
institutions.  Even institutions that are accredited (or reaccredited) receive a 
confidential report from the accrediting agency, which indentifies ways to 
improve the institution.    
There have been a number of challenges to, and court rulings about, the 
authority of regional accreditors.  One of the most important was the 
decision by the Seventh Circuit in North Dakota v. North Central 
Association of Colleges,
172
 which established the authority of regional 
accreditors to act even when the conditions that led them to withdraw 
accreditation from a college were the result of actions by a state 
government.  The court held that, as private associations, accreditors are 
free to establish their own standards.
173
  
II. IMPROVING BOARD OVERSIGHT 
As the previous section has shown, trustees of colleges and universities, 
in addition to meeting the legal standards imposed on the boards of all 
nonprofit corporations, must ensure that their institutions also meet the 
demands of a highly competitive marketplace in higher education, comply 
with state licensing requirements, and satisfy accreditation standards.  
Recent controversies highlight three areas that need particular board 
attention:  (1) avoiding the reputational harm that can result from excessive 
 
support rigorous reviews, and reduce the burden and cost of accreditation; and 
Promoting the active interchange of ideas among public and independent 
institutions that furthers the principles of improved institutional performance, 
educational effectiveness, and the process of peer review. 
Id.  
 171. Eaton, supra note 170, at 6–7.  The time periods for reaccreditation vary.  For 
example, it is seven years for law schools, and ten for the regional accreditors.     
 172. 99 F.2d 697 (7th  Cir. 1938). 
 173.  99 F.2d at 700. 
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compensation or conflicts of interest; (2) understanding that in the eyes of 
the public, the nondistribution constraint applies to academic goods as well 
as to financial assets; and (3) strengthening the quality and autonomy of 
accrediting bodies.   
A. Reputational Harm Caused by Excessive Compensation or 
Conflicts of Interest    
The Stevens complaint suggests that in addition to their oversight of the 
endowment and other assets, governing boards should compare the 
compensation of presidents of similar colleges and universities when 
setting the compensation for the president of their institution.174   
The events at American University underscore that a governing board 
should have procedures in place not only for reviewing the president‘s 
compensation, but for overseeing the president‘s institutional expenditures 
as well.175  No board member should look over a president‘s shoulder, but a 
wise president will welcome a well-crafted review procedure.  For 
example, the compensation committee of the board might establish 
appropriate policies on such matters as presidential travel, meals, and gifts.  
The president‘s expenses then can be reviewed annually by the outside 
auditors to see that they conform to the established policies.   
To ensure that trustees themselves are complying with state law, a 
growing number of college and university boards have adopted conflict-of-
interest policies that require annual disclosures by all board members and 
senior officers of actual conflicts of interest, and of affiliations that might 
create the appearance of such a conflict.176 
Given the importance of faculty to the reputation and revenue of 
institutions of higher education, governing boards also should adopt 
procedures for identifying, and eliminating financial conflicts of interest 
that might compromise the scholarly objectivity of faculty members.177  
 
 174. A 2007 survey of trustees found that a stunning 23%  of trustees did not know 
whether their boards used comparative data to determine the president‘s compensation, 
and 5% reported that the board had no role in determining the president‘s 
compensation. Paul Fain, For Trustees, Faith in College Presidents Lies at the Heart of 
Good Relationships, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 11, 2007, at A14.   
 175. See supra text accompanying notes 86–88. 
 176. A 2009 survey found that 89% of boards have a conflict-of-interest policy, 
compared with only 46.5% in 1986.  Survey of Higher Education Governance, ASS‘N 
OF GOVERNING BDS. 3 (2009).  More boards of private colleges and universities had 
such policies than boards of public institutions because of the use of statewide conflict 
policies for state agencies.  Id.   
 177. In FY 2008, 80% of the budget of the National Institutes of Health (NIH)—
$29.5 billion—was distributed through almost 50,000 competitive grants to researchers 
at over 3,000 universities, medical schools, and other research institutions.  
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
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Public Health Service regulations require all institutions that receive funds 
from the National Institutes of Health to have policies that require 
researchers to disclose ―significant financial interests‖ in entities whose 
financial interests may be affected by their research.178  Governing boards 
should consider extending those disclosure standards to all researchers, 
whether or not they are funded by NIH.   
B. The Nondistribution Constraint and Academic Goods 
In addition to their duty to oversee the financial assets of their college or 
university, governing boards have a fiduciary duty to protect and enhance 
the academic mission of their institution.  As Peter Ewell has explained: 
It is up to the faculty and administration to uphold and improve 
academic quality.  But it is up to the board to understand it and to 
see that it gets done.  Ensuring academic quality is a fiduciary 
responsibility; it is as much part of our role as board members as 
is ensuring that the institution has sufficient resources and is 
spending them wisely.179   
Because faculty are central to the academic success of a college or 
university, conscientious trustees should be as knowledgeable about their 
quality as about the health of the financial assets.180  A good place to begin 
is with faculty hiring and retention patterns.  Unfortunately, it typically is 
easier for a board member to know the win-loss records of an institution‘s 
athletic teams than it is to know how many of the recent offers to hire 
faculty were accepted or rejected, or how many experienced faculty were 
persuaded to leave other institutions to join the school, or how many 
 
HOW GRANTEES MANAGE FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN RESEARCH FUNDED BY 
THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH 1 (Nov. 2009), available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-07-00700.pdf (last visited May 11, 2010).    
 178. 42 C.F.R. § 50.604(a) (2009).  The term ―significant financial interest‖ is 
defined as income to an investigator, or the investigator‘s spouse or dependent child 
that exceeds $10,000 in a year, or an equity interest whose value exceeds that amount 
or 5% ownership in a company.  In 2008, the National Institutes of Health took the 
unprecedented step of suspending a five-year, $9.3 million grant to Emory University 
because the principal investigator on the grant, a tenured faculty member, had failed to 
disclose some $800,000 in payments from pharmaceutical companies.  Joe Pereira, 
Emory Professor Steps Down, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2008, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123000405102929417.html.  A report by the Inspector 
General of the Department of Health and Human Services found that 50% of 
universities do not ask their faculty members to disclose financial conflicts of interest.  
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
supra note 177, at 13.  In addition, university administrators rarely require researchers 
to eliminate or reduce such conflicts.  Id. at ii. 
 179. PETER T. EWELL, MAKING THE GRADE: HOW BOARDS CAN ENSURE ACADEMIC 
QUALITY vii (2006), quoted in EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BOARDS, supra note 48, at 16.    
 180. EWELL, supra note 179, at xiii.   
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departed for other institutions.  Hiring patterns should not be assessed for 
only one year, of course, but over a period of years.  Moreover, hiring 
trends may vary considerably from department to department or school to 
school.  It is important, therefore, for a governing board to work closely 
with academic leaders when reviewing faculty data.   
A major challenge for any governing board is how to promote academic 
quality without undermining the faculty‘s responsibility for academic 
matters.  The importance of respecting the role of the faculty is 
demonstrated by the controversies discussed above.  Several would not 
have occurred if the governing board and administrators had upheld the 
academic standards established by faculty for admitting applicants181 or 
granting degrees to students.182  A conscientious governing board therefore, 
will ensure that faculty members in the institution understand their role in 
overseeing such academic matters as the curriculum, faculty hiring, and 
student academic standards.183  The board also should encourage the faculty 
to establish standards for monitoring the quality of teaching and research.184  
Admissions are a particularly challenging area for many colleges and 
universities.  Because of the additional life-time compensation and social 
prestige that a post-secondary degree brings, the public understandably 
expects that the entrance requirements and graduation standards of an 
institution of higher education will be applied fairly.  If a college or 
university grants public officials or their relatives an advantage in the 
awarding of admission spots or degrees, the public is likely to feel that its 
trust has been betrayed as much as it does when a charitable assets are 
mismanaged.  
Although faculty have primary responsibility for establishing the 
standards for admission,185 in most colleges and universities individual 
admission decisions are made by administrators with little or no faculty 
 
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 96–106.   
 182. See supra text accompanying notes 89–95.   
 183. New faculty members might benefit as much as new trustees from some 
orientation about their governance responsibilities. 
 184. See EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BOARDS, supra note 48, at 15.  
The faculty and academic administrators—not the board—determine the 
manner in which subjects are selected and taught, faculty members are 
recruited . . . curricula are reviewed and revised, student progress and 
performance are assessed, and degrees are awarded.  Yet it is appropriate for 
the board to convey its expectations that faculty will establish and monitor 
standards for teaching and learning, as well as for curricular review and 
revision. 
Id. 
 185. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 363 (2003) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects four academic freedoms first identified by Justice Frankfurter: to 
determine ―who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may 
be admitted to study.‖). 
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participation.  Because they do not have tenure, administrators are likely to 
be particularly vulnerable to pressure from senior administrators or trustees 
to admit applicants who would not be admitted on their merits.  As the 
Mikva report found, it is important to have an admissions process that 
treats all applicants fairly.186  Striking the right balance between resisting 
improper pressure to admit a particular applicant, and being fair to all 
applicants is not easy.  The report, for example, did not recommend 
prohibiting all letters of support from prominent officials or donors.  It did 
recommend limiting them to standard letters of recommendation.  A 
complete ban on such letters presumably would not be fair to an applicant 
who had worked for a public figure, and who would thereby be unable to 
submit a letter of recommendation from his or her employer.  To ensure 
that even letters of recommendation from prominent individuals are not 
given undue weight, the report recommended that the university adopt a 
written admissions policy that clearly sets forth the factors that may be 
considered in admissions decisions.187  It also recommended that 
admissions decisions be made by a committee, rather than by a single 
person, on the ground that a committee is less likely to cave to improper 
pressure to admit a particular applicant.188  Finally, the report 
recommended that no answer should be given to inquiries about the status 
of an applicant from prominent individuals who are not members of an 
applicant‘s family (or the equivalent).  Any admissions-related inquiries 
from unrelated, prominent individuals should be documented, the report 
advised, and the inquirers notified that such documentation is subject to 
disclosure under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act.189  In short, as 
Justice Brandeis recommended, sunshine should be used as a 
disinfectant.190 
C. Strengthening Accreditation 
One of the most effective ways of measuring academic quality is the 
accreditation process.  In some respects, accreditation is to academic 
programs what audits are to financial affairs.  A careful board will take 
advantage of the opportunity accreditation presents, therefore, by reviewing 
with the institution‘s academic leadership the reports of the various 
accreditation visiting teams.
191
   
 
 186. See supra text accompanying note 105. 
 187. STATE OF ILLINOIS ADMISSIONS REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 101, at 43. 
 188. Id. at 36. 
 189. Id. at 43–44. 
 190. LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE‘S MONEY—AND HOW BANKERS USE IT 67 
(1914), available at http://www.law.louisville.edu/library/collections/ 
brandeis/node/191 (last visited May 11, 2010). 
 191.  The Association for Governing Boards concurs: 
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Unfortunately, in recent years the federal government has increasingly 
threatened the independence of the American system of accreditation.  
Although President Taft blocked the earliest effort to have the federal 
government assume responsibility for accreditation, once substantial 
federal funds began to flow to higher education, predictably more federal 
oversight followed.  When the GI Bill was reauthorized in 1952 and 
extended to cover Korean War veterans, Congress also authorized the 
Commissioner of Education to publish ―a list of nationally recognized 
accrediting agencies and associations which he determines to be reliable 
authority as to the quality of training offered by an educational 
institution.‖192    
A more serious challenge arose in 1992 when Congress required every 
state to establish a State Postsecondary Review Entity (SPRE) that would 
review institutions identified by the Secretary of Education as having 
specified problems, such as a high default rate on student loans.
193
  Most 
accreditors saw this as a direct attempt either to eliminate accreditation or 
to federalize accrediting organizations.
194
  In 1995, however, the challenge 
was defanged when President Clinton signed into law a bill that rescinded 
funding for the SPREs.
195
  In 1998, the Reauthorization of the Higher 
Education Act entirely eliminated the SPRE requirement, along with a 
companion requirement that accrediting agencies carry out unannounced 
visits to campuses.
196
      
The most recent federal challenge to the independence of accreditation 
bodies came from the Executive Branch rather than Congress.  Federal law 
provides that colleges and universities must be accredited by an accrediting 
agency recognized by the Secretary of Education if they want to be eligible 
to receive federal student financial assistance.
197
  Under the leadership of 
 
An especially valuable source of [information about academic quality] is 
board participation in the external review of academic units and the institution 
as a whole by regional and specialized accrediting associations.  The board 
should commit substantial time to read and discuss the reports of accreditation 
visiting teams, under the guidance of the president and academic 
administrators who bear direct responsibility for the units under review. 
EFFECTIVE GOVERNING BOARDS, supra note 48, at 16.   
 192.  Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284.   
 193.  1992 Amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. 102-325, 106 
Stat. 448, discussed in BLOLAND, supra note 168, at 39–40.   
 194.  BLOLAND, supra note 168, at 40. 
 195.  Id. at 117. 
 196.  Id. at 189. 
 197.  Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (November 8, 
1965), codified as amended in 20 U.S.C. §1001 et seq.  Colleges and universities must 
meet three requirements to be eligible for Title IV student financial-assistance-program 
funds: they must be (1) certified by the Department of Education as eligible; (2) 
accredited by an accrediting agency recognized by the Secretary of Education and (3) 
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Secretary Margaret Spellings, the Department of Education in 2006 began 
to press accrediting associations to require the institutions they accredit to 
assess student achievement or risk being denied official recognition by the 
Department.
198
  In response, Congress in the Higher Education Opportunity 
Act of 2008 (HEOC) prohibited the Department of Education from 
regulating the manner in which accrediting agencies assess student 
achievement.
199
   
Although Congress rebuffed the most recent federal challenge to the 
autonomy and flexibility of private accreditors, the pressure on the federal 
government to increase its regulation of accreditors may prove irresistible 
in the future, given the large amount of federal funding that goes to higher 
education.
200
  Certainly the requirement that colleges and universities must 
be accredited by an agency recognized by the Secretary of Education for 
their students to receive federal financial assistance gives the federal 
government enormous potential leverage over accreditors.  If accreditation 
is to endure, institutions of higher education and their governing boards 
need to understand and to support the capacity of the American system of 
accreditation to provide accountability without losing its independence 
from government control.   
 
licensed or authorized by the state education agency in which they operate.  The review 
process is set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 1099b; 34 C.F.R. Part 602.   
 198.  See A. Lee Fritschler, Government Should Stay Out of Accreditation, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., May 18, 2007, at B20: 
. . . Last September a report by the Spellings Commission on the Future of 
Higher Education expressed grave concern about the quality and purpose of 
colleges and universities. . . . One remedy that the Education Department has 
proposed would give accrediting agencies responsibility not only to evaluate 
institutions for access to federal student-aid money but also to set and enforce 
minimum standards for ―student achievement.‖  Under draft rules, if the 
department decides that the learning standards than an accreditor applies to 
institutions are not sufficiently high, it can withdraw the accrediting agency‘s 
power to accredit. . . . 
 199.  Pub. L. 110-315, 122 Stat. 3078.  HEOC also reconfigured the National 
Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity, which recommends 
whether particular accreditors should be approved by the Secretary.  Formerly, all 
members of the Committee were appointed by the Secretary of Education.  In the 
future, one-third of the eighteen members will be appointed by the Secretary, one third 
by the Senate, and one-third by the House of Representatives. Pub. L. 110–315, 122 
Stat. 3091. 
200
  By 2005, the federal government for the first time provided more financial 
support for higher education than the states.  Federal funding included $61 billion 
in loans, $18 billion in direct student-aid grants, and an estimated $8 billion in tax 
support for a total of more than $90 billion.  All the states combined provided 
about $74 billion that year of which $7 billion was for financial aid.  F. King 
Alexander, The States’ Failure to Support Higher Education, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., June 30, 2006, at B16.   
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III.  CONCLUSION 
College and universities in the United States differ from most 
institutions of higher education in their use of lay governing boards, which 
shield them from excessive government control, and in their adoption of 
shared governance, which gives faculties rather than boards primary 
responsibility for academic matters.  Shared governance also protects from 
public and trustee pressure the free inquiry that is central to the 
effectiveness and productivity of modern academic institutions.  The 
combination of lay governing boards and shared governance has been a 
major force in developing the best higher education sector in the world.   
Private colleges and universities and their governing boards are subject 
to the same laws that apply to all nonprofit corporations.  State nonprofit 
corporation laws impose on governing boards duties of care and of loyalty 
to the mission of preserving, transmitting, and increasing knowledge.  They 
also prohibit the distribution of surplus resources to those in charge of the 
institution—apart from the payment of reasonable compensation for goods 
and services.  Federal tax laws reinforce this nondistribution constraint and 
are the source of more than $4 billion annually in tax exemptions and 
deductions for higher education.    
 State nonprofit corporation laws, however, have been enforced against 
colleges and universities only in the most extreme circumstances.  
Competition, therefore, remains the most important form of board 
accountability.  State licensing laws establish minimum standards that 
academic institutions must meet in order to offer degrees, but they 
generally do not focus on increasing academic quality above the minimum.  
Accreditation, by contrast, is as concerned with quality improvement as 
with quality assurance.  This distinctly American form of accountability is 
carried out by private, voluntary associations that use self-studies and peer 
assessment to evaluate colleges and universities and to advise them on how 
to improve their programs and functions.  Accreditation also has helped to 
protect the autonomy of the higher education sector from government 
control, although the federal government in recent years has taken an 
increasingly active role in regulating the accreditors.  In fulfilling their 
fiduciary duty to preserve the fiscal integrity of their institutions, governing 
boards should pay particular attention to the compensation and 
expenditures of their presidents.  They also should adopt conflict-of-
interest policies that apply to governing board members as well as policies 
that ensure that the scholarly objectivity of faculty is not compromised by 
financial conflicts of interest. 
 Governing boards also have a fiduciary duty to protect and enhance 
the academic quality of the college or university they oversee.  Because the 
public expects the nondistribution constraint to apply to academic goods as 
well as to financial resources, governing boards should be particularly 
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careful to uphold the standards established by faculties for such academic 
matters as admitting applicants and granting degrees. Finally, governing 
boards need to understand and to support the system of accreditation that 
has developed in the United States to improve academic quality without 
increasing the role of the government in higher education.  
 
